The term information asymmetry arises when the parties involved in an economic transaction are not equally informed. According to Laffont, classical economics has not focused on information asymmetry for many years since the theory of value gained people's concentration. However, it was still unclear how some entrepreneurs could maximize employee profit by delegating duties to other members of the company. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Marschank and Radner developed a theory that identifies the asymmetric nature of information and focuses on the correct management of information for better coordination. In an old version of the model economy, it was assumed that all parties involved have perfect information, which is not the case in most cases. This approach that parties have perfect information was modified in 1961 by Stigler in his well-cited article entitled Economic of Information. Subsequently, Akerlof, who is one of the pioneers in this topic, examined all the results of information asymmetry in the automotive market. When we compare the classic economic model and the modern one, it is obvious that in the new version the interaction between players is inevitable. Therefore, over the past twenty years there has been significant growth in the economic literature on contract design under conditions of information asymmetry. In particular, according to Antle, the food market by its nature is determined by imperfect information along with its supply chain which increases costs during the economic phase. transaction. Of course, the food industry is subject to unknown characteristics. In many cases, indicators such as quality and safety are only recognized after consumption. Nelson has a classification for all goods, he states that those attributes which are identified directly after purchase as goods of experience and belief are those whose attributes cannot be noticed after purchase. There are two main actors identified in the economic transaction based on information allocation: agent and principle. The agent is the one who has the information and the principle is the one who tries to understand the actions of the agent and the good characteristics offered by the agent. Asymmetric information can represent a moral hazard after bargaining when the agent's action cannot be observed in principle, as well as adverse selection before bargaining when the specification of the good is discovered in principle. Usually in the food industry, the agent tries to hide information especially when it comes to the quality specifications of the food. Therefore the principle's effort to disclose information will not be successful and will lead to depreciation of goods in the market. Over the last twenty years there has been a notable increase in asymmetric information, especially in fields such as food quality, chain relationships and agri-environment. In the modern economy, interactions between actors are increasing, which are increasingly linked to the amount of information they exchange. Antle (2001) stated that the food market by its nature is driven by imperfect information with asymmetric allocations along the supply chain which are responsible for increasing costs during economic transactions. Recognition of the various social and economic conditions that influence the collaboration of actors along the supply chain is key to increasing the competitiveness of European agriculture. This article aims to report the influence of asymmetric information problemson the Irish agri-food supply chain. The literature stream focuses on issues regarding information asymmetry related to food attributes. There are two main food attributes: quality and food safety, which in many cases are not easy to measure. Therefore, information relating to product safety and quality is placed highly asymmetrically throughout the supply chain. An important point to consider is that quality and safety attributes along the supply chain are generally not easy to identify.identified and tracked along the agri-food supply chain. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, in many cases the attributes are experience (those attributes of the food that can be identified after purchase) or belief (those attributes of the food that cannot be determined after purchase). The two main attributes of food, food quality and food safety, have been a much discussed topic over the last 20 years. In particular, food safety as it concerns public health. The quality of the food divided into two parts. They can be those specifications that the good should satisfy, such as any technical specifications, or a value such as the level of suitability for the specific use. However, nowadays, quality is more about customer orientation rather than efficiency and quality control. Increasing the quality level of the product or adding value to the product all depends on the customer's expectations. According to Grunert, the two concepts of safety and quality in the agri-food sector are driven by the actors of the food market chain (Grunert, 2005). Therefore, supermarkets that reflect customer needs are identified as the main players in the food supply chain. On the other hand, the perception of value is personal (Swatz, 2006), therefore points relating to customer beliefs are separate from the attributes and norms that the food should satisfy. Stevenson and Pirog defined the food supply chain as a network of food-related businesses. business. Therefore, the food supply chain is characterized by a high level of interactions that information exchange influences the success of the supply chain. One of the most important factors that helps relationship development is trust (Johnston, et al. 2004). There are two main approaches adopted on the concept of trust in scientific literature, the economic one and the social one. In institutional economics, trust is afforded as opportunistic behavior that analyzes the interaction between agents with the use of game theory modeling. The social developed by the sociologist focuses on developing trust in relationships. The present study does not address the development of trust while it is more related to the socio-anthropological approach, but focuses more on the opportunistic behavior generated due to information asymmetry with an economic approach. Some solutions are available in the literature to correct asymmetric information in the food supply chain. One concerns the acquisition of information which involves costs to improve the quality and accuracy of the information. The second consists of vertical coordination as vertical integration. The third option is the adoption of food standards, certificates and insurance issued by third parties. And finally the last option will be regulation, some rules that apply coordination between public and private agents to help food operators adopt the terms of food safety regulations. As Stringer mentioned in his well-cited article, the food supply chain can be divided into the following stages:.