IndexAbstractKilling vs. letting dieArtificial and natural life supportPAS Alignment with appropriate palliative careThe harm of existingInconclusive evidenceConclusionAbstractThis review covers the current legal and ethical perspectives of scholars in the field of bioethics regarding physician-assisted suicide (PAS). It covers the development of new arguments for or against PAS that have been put forward by various authors. These arguments vary in their interpretation of what constitutes “killing someone” versus what constitutes “letting someone die.” This literature review will cover the opinions of scholars who argue that these distinctions are clear and obvious, as well as the opinions of others who believe that no separation should be drawn between voluntary passive euthanasia and voluntary active euthanasia. In addition to outlining the trends followed by the debate, this review predicts where the industry will go in the future. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Killing vs. Letting Die To determine whether euthanasia is ethical or not, philosophers and doctors have worked to draw a distinction between active and passive activity causing a death. This topic was addressed by Jeff McMahan in 1993 when he stated that the difference between letting a person die and killing him involves assigning a reason for that person's near-death state. [1] He argues that if you withdraw help from another person after causing that person to need help, you are effectively killing that person. Alternatively, if you withdraw aid after a person has been placed in a critical state due to unrelated causes, then you let that person die. In relation to the topic of physician-assisted suicide (hereinafter PAS), this implies that a doctor removing life support would let that person die and not kill them unless the doctor caused the patient to need life support in the first place vital. While this argument attempts to clarify the distinction between actively killing a person and passively letting them die, it does not address the moral worth of each case. Support for artificial and natural life Alternatively, David Shaw strives to reduce the distinction between voluntary passive euthanasia (VPE) and voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Rather than splitting the two as McMahon does, Shaw states that removing life support in the VPE is equivalent to providing a lethal injection or similar actions in the VAE because both eliminate the forces that keep a person alive; in the case of VPE, this force is artificially applied life support, while in VAE, this force is the very body in which a person's mind is trapped.2 Both life support and the living body keep the person alive against their will, so killing a person's body is similar to removing their ventilator or other type of life support equipment. Shaw's view supports the use of VAE and VPE by arguing that VAE is simply another form of VPE, a generally accepted process more often. Critical of this view, Hugh McClachlan does not accept the claim that a person is defined by his mind. 3 He believes that the desire to commit suicide justifies medical attention. The doctor's opinion does not oblige the doctor to actively participate in the resulting actions. McClachlan cites an analogous situation, the offering of sexual advice by a doctor, as an example of how a doctor can provide suggestions or treatments without engaging in implementing those suggestions. The statement that the VPE and the VAEare ethically moral is often challenged by popular opinion that only VPE should be legalized. In essence, McClachlan disagrees with Shaw's argument that the two forms of euthanasia are morally similar. PAS Aligning with appropriate palliative care Michael Gill offers an argument based on similar premises to those provided by Jeff McMahon. He works to confirm the idea that PAS does not violate physicians' ideals of adequate end-of-life care.4 Critics argue that physical pain should be eliminated if adequate palliative care is in place and that psychological pain is not sufficient to justify PAS. , but Gill disagrees, stating that the subjectivity of psychological pain, like hopelessness, can be based on realistic judgments about a person's future well-being. In these cases, it is appropriate for a patient to feel that his or her death would be preferable to continued or imminent suffering. Gill also proposes that not all physical pain can be eradicated with the use of palliative care, so doctors have the right to euthanize patients if they require PAS while mentally healthy. Contrary to McMahon's previous opinion, this approach does not focus on drawing a distinction between active and passive euthanasia, but works to demonstrate the permissibility of both actions.[2]The harm of the existingAccording to David Benatar, determining whether they exist If a form of medically assisted suicide is permissible, it is necessary to compare the harm suffered by continued existence with the relief from pain that non-existence can provide. 5 The main claim of his book, Better Never to Have Been, is that human beings are harmed when they come into the world, but they are not harmed if they never come into the world, so it is preferable to prevent human beings from coming into the world. He clarifies that this view does not encourage suicide in all cases by recognizing the fact that there is a difference between continuing existence and preventing existence from occurring. It may be in a person's best interest to continue to exist once he exists, but it may also be beneficial for him to cease to exist if his life is unbearably bad. Benatar's perspective ultimately supports Michael Gill's argument that death might be better for a suffering person than a painful, prolonged existence. In this case, medically assisted suicide is advocated on the basis of its benefit to people whose lives are full enough of pain and suffering to make death a more attractive option than life. Inconclusive Evidence While many scholars have taken firm positions on how they view PAS as a moral and legal dilemma, others, such as Bonnie Steinbock, have remained uncertain due to the different mix of evidence for and against PAS.6 According to Steinbock, the need for PAS is currently “unproven,” so an ongoing discussion needs to take place so that some conclusions can actually be drawn. He acknowledges both sides of the debate, citing the suffering and autonomy arguments championed by Michael Gill, but also considers the other side by referring to religious arguments and the idea of ​​doctors as individuals who heal, rather than hurt, their patients. Steinbeck evaluates several cases of individuals who spent prolonged periods of time suffering from terminal illnesses. It examines two patients, one who chose PAS and one who did not, to analyze the factors that contribute to their decisions while offering perspectives that both support and belittle those who value PAS. His technique of referring to both sides where he sees fit is one that allows for an unbiased perspective.