IndexAbstractIntroductionConclusionAbstractTraditionally, high walls have existed to separate different areas of the justice field. The theorists who built the wall between criminal justice and distributive justice never managed to complete it and deliberately created many gates. Identifies different views on what characterizes distributive justice, as opposed to other types of justice and non-justice-based moral demands. The criminal justice system includes institutions, policies, and practices with the goal of maintaining social control and deterring crime through sanctions and rehabilitation. This article argues that there is indeed a distributive logic to changes in current criminal law. The distributive theory of criminal law holds that an offender should be punished, not because he is guilty or because punishment increases network security, but because punishment appropriately distributes pleasure and pain between the offender and the victim. Criminal laws are therefore distributive when they inflict punishment with the aim of ensuring the well-being of victims. In recent decades, one, if not the most important, dominant political message has emphasized strict individualism and argued that the state lacks the power to deprive a blameless person of assets (or “rights”) in order to ensure well-being. of another. Denouncing criminal law as distributionist undermines these individuals' stated pre-political commitment to government distribution. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay "As a simple matter of distributive justice, a decent and compassionate society should recognize the plight of its victims and design its criminal system to ease their pain, not increase it.”, - Anthony Kennedy.IntroductionJustice means satisfying the legitimate expectation of the individual according to the laws and ensure the benefit promised therein. Justice seeks to reconcile individual rights with the social good. It requires that no discrimination is made between the various members of society. To define justice it is essential to refer to the root idea of ​​the word “Jus” which means to join or adapt. Therefore, justice has the meaning of cementing and uniting human beings together The values ​​of freedom, equality and fraternity are important in any system of law and justice. These values ​​exist in different proportions and there are also conflicts between them. The concept of justice is not static. With the changes in society, the concept of justice has also changed from time to time. Justice is an evolutionary concept. The idea of ​​justice simpliciter, with which it is often used interchangeably, the idea of ​​distributive justice has been understood to refer to different things: justice theorists have adopted different views, mostly without any acknowledgment or defense explicit of them, about what characterizes and delimits the demands of justice as opposed to other moral demands, for example, the demands of legitimacy, community, efficiency or stability, to name a few central ones. They also adopted different views on what characterizes distributive justice compared to other types of justice. Distributive justice, also known as economic justice, is about fairness in what people receive, from goods to attention. Its roots are in the social order and it is at the roots of socialism, where equality is a fundamental principle. Forregarding distributive justice, some have hypothesized that what distinguishes it from other types of justice is that it is justice only in the distribution of material or economic advantages, or that it concerns only the allocation, rather than the production, of given goods; others have instead equated the idea of ​​distributive justice with that of social justice, and used it to refer to all the principles that regulate the balancing of individual claims to all the possible benefits of social cooperation. Justice theorists broadly endorse abstract and shared concepts of justice and distributive justice: they agree that justice consists in giving everyone their due or treating similar cases equally; and that distributive justice is justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens to individuals, or consists in the balancing of competing claims that people make to the benefits that are to be distributed. The laws that define crime represent a small part of the legal field and create a vast web of entanglements. Society needs a way to handle individuals who violate these laws and those who are victims of crimes, hence the development of the criminal justice system. The term criminal justice system is used to describe the three main components of criminal justice: law enforcement, courts, and correctional institutions. Law enforcement agencies are responsible for investigating crimes and arresting people suspected of committing crimes. The courts are responsible for interpreting and applying the law in these cases. The correctional component protects society from criminals through housing, monitoring, and other community-based programs. In some cases, corrections involves incarceration in jails or prisons, while in other cases it consists of supervision in the community, parole, or probation. In the most extreme cases, it means putting a criminal to death. Another important aspect of the criminal justice system – which has received deserved and improved attention in recent years – is the victim. A greater emphasis on integrating victims into the system and paying attention to their needs and desires is more evident today in law enforcement, courts and correctional institutions. The problem of distributive justice in justice as fairness is always this: how are the institutions of the basic structure to be regulated as a unified scheme of institutions so that a fair, efficient and productive system of social cooperation can be maintained over time, by a generation to the next? Contrast this with the very different problem of how a given set of commodities is to be distributed, or allocated, among various individuals whose particular needs, desires, and preferences are known to us, and who have not cooperated in any way to produce those commodities. This second problem is that of allocative justice. To illustrate: by accepting the implicit assumptions in interpersonal cardinal comparisons of well-being, we could, for example, allocate the basket of goods so as to obtain the maximum summed satisfaction over these individuals from the present into the future. As a political conception of justice, the classical principle of utility can be seen as an adaptation of the idea of ​​allocative justice to be a principle unique to the underlying structure over time. The idea of ​​allocative justice was rejected because it was incompatible with the fundamental principles with which justice as fairness is organized: the idea of ​​society as a just system of social cooperation over time. Citizens are seen as cooperating to produce the social resources on which their claims are based. In a well-ordered society, in which I amWith both equality of fundamental freedoms and fair equality of opportunity guaranteed, the distribution of income and wealth illustrates what we might call pure underlying procedural justice. The basic structure is organized so that everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of cooperation and honors the claims specified by the rules, the particular distributions of goods that result are as acceptable as whatever those distributions turn out to be. Distribution in the criminal context has not been theorized as in the tort context. However, it appears clear that remuneration and utility have the same hostile relationship towards criminal distribution as guilt and utility. Efficiency depends on the distribution of crimes. Penal distribution dictates that the criminal receives the amount of punishment that will restore the victim to an appropriate state. To put it in tort terms, when a defendant is not punished, the victim must “bear the full burden” of the crime, while the imposition of punishment relieves the victim from shouldering the full burden of suffering. The punishment dictated by the victim's need for closure may be less or more than what constitutes adequate deterrence or desert. A somewhat related school of retributivism has recently emerged, according to which the perpetrator “deserves” to compensate the victims. The idea that the law serves a compensatory function has been a staple of tort theory for generations. Corrective justice occupies a philosophical middle ground between retributivism and distributionism because it requires guilt as a trigger of responsibility and distribution as a corollary. Although the injurer's ability to compensate does not create liability, the injurer who is guilty and therefore responsible must compensate. Some describe retribution compensation as what the offending actor deserves. However, it is unclear why compensating the victim is what an offender must do. Indeed, compensation rationalization encounters even more problems when the compensation amount refers to unpredictable damages. Many argue that compensation is necessary to vindicate the victims' value. If valuing victims is key, however, it seems that blame is unnecessary. A person injured through blameless conduct is no less worth than a person injured through negligence. Proponents of corrective justice respond with the tautological argument that only wrongful acts create the need for victim vindication. But then there is the question of why only guilty action is normatively related to correction. Ultimately, it may be that corrective justice reflects both a distributive distrust of a society that forces victims to bear the costs of accidental injuries and the reality of an individualized tort regime that prioritizes fault. However, the reframing of blame and distribution as correction produces distorting effects that both retributivists and distributionists condemn. Remedial revisions of criminal law have recently made their way into the criminal justice literature as victims become more important actors in the penal system. Theorist George Fletcher, for example, believes that retributive justice requires “seeking equality between offender and victim by subjecting the offender to punishment.” The attempt to fit victim-based justifications for punishment into a retributive framework has been met with skepticism by retributivists, who conclude that Fletcher's program “does not seem retributive; seems compensatory for the victims. Furthermore, although some considerations on the.