In the first two books of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the function of human beings is to practice rational activity, which completed over the course of a lifetime makes for a good life. Aristotle first explores the function and purposes of all actions and things, defines the function of human beings as rational activity, more closely defines the human ability to reason in relation to the human soul, and then begins to connect rational activity to the very important practice of virtues. In this essay I will explore these topics in more depth by looking for alternative conclusions and weaknesses in Aristotle's reasoning, which begins with the statement that all things have purposes and a function, and culminates in an ethics based on virtues. For brevity, I will not address Aristotle's argument about ends as a means to the higher end of happiness. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Actions Have Ends (1094a1-5 and 1097a1) Aristotle states that all actions have ends, the completion of which is the function of said action. He gives examples: “health is the end of medicine, a boat for building boats, the victory of general power, and the wealth of household management” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a.3). The end of each action is considered the good of that action (1097a1), and so it logically follows that the function of said activity is to achieve this good. For example, Tom knits scarves. Tom must think that making scarves is a good thing, perhaps because he likes to have a variety of scarves in his wardrobe. The function of her knitting is to create scarves, which are the purpose of her business. So, the benefit of Tom's knitting is the creation of scarves. Aristotle complicates his statement with two technicalities: “Wherever there are ends in addition to actions, products are by nature better than activities” (1094a.2). Ends can take two forms: intangible assets or tangible products (1094a2). Aristotle classifies products as intrinsically better – which I take to mean more importantly – than activities. In Tom's case, the scarves themselves are better than the knitting skills he acquires in the process of making the scarves. This seems plausible, since the supposed goal of learning to knit scarves is to have the scarves themselves. However, what if the purpose of Tom's knitting was to relax by doing a repetitive activity? She still uses scarves and finds having this product to be just as rewarding as being able to relax while knitting. In this situation, it might follow from Aristotle's reasoning that the scarf itself is still intrinsically better than Tom's relaxation. This seems strange. Taking Aristotle's statement to the extreme, Tom's scarves would be intrinsically better than lounging even if he had never used a scarf and discarded all the scarves he had made. A counterargument is that once Tom no longer cares for the scarves, his original business is no longer knitting scarves. Her activity would be knitting to relax, and in the end it is called relaxation. Both interpretations show the complexity and ambiguity already latent in Aristotle's logic, which weakens the overall basis of Aristotle's argument. Confusion over the importance of tangible versus intangible ends here may lead to further confusion once Aristotle addresses the function of human beings. A further complication comes with the possibility of multiple ends: “And so, if there is an end to all that is achievablein action, the good achievable in action will be this end; if there are more ends than one, [the good obtainable in the action] will be these ends” (1097a1). With the proposition that some ends are better than others and the possibility of multiple ends, one may experience the natural need to rank the importance of each end. There may be many beneficial purposes in Tom's knitting: scarves, relaxation, development of practical skills, increased hand dexterity, gratitude or money from those who receive the scarves, respect from people impressed by Tom's skills in the work knitted, and so the list of purposes goes on. It seems simplistic and unreasonable to conclude that the scarf itself outweighs the value of all these other purposes. However, it may be necessary to choose a higher purpose by considering Aristotle's language when talking about function. Aristotle considers many ends for an action, but only one function. Therefore, as a knitter, Tom can gain many tangible and intangible ends from knitting, but the ultimate function of being a knitter is to work well by making excellent scarves. The transition from plural ends to singular functions is puzzling. This becomes significant when Aristotle assumes that human beings have a single function: rational activity. All the actions and goals that make up a prosperous life must somehow relate to this singular function. One might counter my criticism by saying that all ends are ultimately means to the single end of happiness, a topic I will not fully address in this essay. All things have a function: professions and body parts (1097a9-11) In Section 7 of Book I, Aristotle moves from ends to functions, in particular the function of professions and parts of the human body. In this article I will accept the statement that happiness is the ultimate goal of human life. To better understand what happiness entails, Aristotle prescribes that “we first grasp the function of a human being” (1097a10). The function determines the actions and, consequently, the ends. Tom's function as a knitter is to work well. Its characteristic action is knitting and its end is a well-made scarf. Surprisingly, Aristotle is in a sense working backwards by first defining the human goal as happiness and then trying to find human function as a way to discern what human activity should be. First, he firmly established that actions have functions. Aristotle often speaks of actions and professions as synonyms, since many of the actions he mentions – flautist, sculptor, craftsman, boat builder, general – are also professions (1094a3, 1097b9). It follows that all professions have a function. “Then the carpenter and the leather worker have their functions and actions, but the human being has no function? Is he by nature idle, without any function?” (1097b10). Here is Aristotle's first logical leap. He equates professions and actions with human beings, but these are not the same thing at all. Expecting humans to have an innate function because other crafts, actions, and decisions appear to have functions is a reasonable line of thinking, but not consistent logical proof. It may be that humans are “by nature idle” (1097b10). Without external influence – whether commanded to do a job, survival needs, social or religious expectations – humans could be aimless. True, this idea seems unlikely, but Aristotle does not address this possibility in any depth. This is a characteristic problem of empirical theories, where observations lead to highly probable conclusions, but lack the unquestioned authority that comes from purely logical proof. Theycontinues by examining the function of body parts: “Or, just as the eye, hand, foot, and in general every part of the body apparently has its function, can we also attribute to a human being some function in addition to all these ? (1097b11). Organs have functions: eyes ensure vision, hands ensure dexterity, feet ensure mobility. Once again, equating body parts with the entire human being seems to be a logical stretch. It's like saying, “Big toes work to keep us balanced, so humans work for that. . .” This is in contrast to the next step in Aristotle's argument, in which he attributes to humans the special ability to reason. Within the paragraphs, humans are equated with feet and designated as the only species capable of reasoning, effectively placing humans above all other living species. The function of human activity is rational activity(1098a12-14)The next stage of Aristotle's reasoning is to demonstrate that “the special function of a human being” is “the activity and actions of the soul involving reason (1097b12, 1098a14). For purposes of modern interpretation, the "soul" is like the "mind". Let's retrace his reasoning: Aristotle first assumes that the function of human beings is unique to them. He can then use the process of elimination to discover which character trait is a function: humans share “a life of nutrition and growth” with all living things and a “life of sense perception” with all animals, so these are not eligible (1098a12). The only trait that Aristotle considers unique to humans is the capacity for reason or rationality (1098a13). However, just having the ability to reason does not guarantee a good life, one must actively practice reason throughout life. Done well, this will lead to happiness and a fulfilling life. There are several objections one might have to this conclusion, one of which is that the ability to reason, or rationality, is not exclusive to human beings. In modern times, many people believe that non-human animals have the ability to reason and possibly feel emotions like humans. Suppose Tom the Knitter has a dog, Frodo. Frodo displays many actions that seem to show reasoning ability: Frodo seems particularly attached to certain people, including Tom. Frodo also has preferences when it comes to food and toys. When faced with an obstacle course or a new trick that is difficult to learn, Frodo does well at solving the puzzle. There is clearly a communication system that Frodo uses with other dogs as well as Tom. It is unclear whether Frodo has the same capacity for self-reflection, morality, and foresight as Tom, traits that may be vital to Aristotle's conception of rationality. The conception of animal intelligence in the BC era was very different from that of today. From a modern perspective, rationality can also be disqualified as a “special function” of human beings in Aristotle's process of elimination. There are many other aspects of human life that could be considered unique to humans: sophisticated language patterns for communication, physical differences from other animals, greater capacity for empathy with other humans, greater connection with one god than others animals, very complex civilizations, unrivaled cultural diversity within the species, and so on. Aristotle does not consider these options in the Nicomachean Ethics. Even if he saw one of these characteristics as peculiar to human beings in addition to rationality, the hypothesis that beings have a single function would leave room only for the latter characteristic. ThereAristotle's prescription for rational activity performed well throughout life is both restrictive and restrictive. frustratingly ambiguous. Immediately after discussing rationality, Aristotle reminds the reader that: “This then is a sketch of the good; for presumably we must draw the outline first and complete it afterwards” (1098a17). Although limited to the first two books of the Nicomachean Ethics, to this "outline of the good", it is difficult to precisely define the Aristotelian conception of rationality. Strictly speaking, a life and “a soul according to reason or requiring reason” may require a life dedicated to contemplation, such as that of a philosopher (1098a14). In this case, Tom may not be living a good life by spending all his time absentmindedly knitting. Tom may be a kind person with scarves that benefit others, but he is not necessarily engaged in rational activities. In a broader interpretation, Tom could live a good, rational life by acting practically and recognizing that being a knitter is the most beneficial lifestyle he can achieve. Tom can also lead a rational life by living virtuously, as I will explain later in this essay. In the next section, Aristotle's notion of reason becomes clearer when he relates reason to the soul, the next phase of his argument that I will discuss. The human soul is composed of multiple parts(1102a9-1103a19)The soul, which can be considered the mind in modern terms, is divided into rational and non-rational parts. The non-rational part of the soul is divided into two parts: half controls nutrition and growth, which is present in all living things, and the other half represents what Aristotle calls “appetite and desires” (1102a11, 1102b18) . Desire is a part of the soul that sometimes “collides and struggles with reason” (1102b15). The characteristic of a person who excels in human function – who can be called an excellent and virtuous person – is having a soul in which the desires are in sync with the rational half of the soul (1102b16). Desires that do not “listen to reason” cause people to act irrationally or inappropriately (1102b18). Desires can be in sync with the rational soul at different levels; the more synchronized they are, the more virtuous the person is. Aristotle briefly states that the rational half of the soul is also divided into a sect that has innate reason and a sect that listens to reasons as the desiring soul does (1103a19). Let us explore the soul of Tom the Weaver as a means of clarification. Tom's soul-nourishing cult keeps him alive and functioning at the most basic level, as a living being. There's recently been a problem within Tom's knitting guild: a dispute has broken out among the knitters, and the guild is considering splitting into smaller organizations. The yearning and irrational cult of Tom's soul is driving him to split the guild. Tom's desire is fueled by anger towards other knitters, pride, and a tendency to act radically in situations like these. One of the older members of the guild advises Tom to resist the split, as it will ultimately harm all members of the guild, including Tom. The rational part of Tom's mind that listens to reason recognizes that the eldest member of the guild is right. Indeed, the intrinsically rational part of Tom's mind had already been reassured that encouraging the split had been a bad decision. Being a mostly virtuous person, Tom acts rationally and decides to help maintain unity within the knitting guild. All sects of Tom's soul must be in sync for him to not only think.