Much has been written by philosophers in recent centuries on the mind-body problem, which addresses the question relating to the duality between one's physical entities and mental. By pushing this question further, one can explore some rather interesting areas of philosophical thought. For example, when you approach this issue in terms of pain, you begin to explore the real distinctions between attributing pain to others based on your own experience of pain. This example in particular is quite appealing because it also taps into philosophical skepticism, as it forces the question of skepticism about pain. The question, then, that will be debated in this article is whether one can be philosophically justified in formulating the hypothesis that one's own pain can be felt in the same way as someone else's pain. In this article, drawing on arguments coming both from philosophical skepticism, through the arguments of David Hume, and from the mind-body problem, in particular from the arguments of Bertrand Russell and Thomas Nagel, before delving into possible counterarguments, it will be argued that one's Personal sense of pain cannot and should not be attributed to other individuals. We say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Examining Hume's argument about philosophical skepticism, it appears that an individual's perception of pain cannot be accurate in describing another individual's pain. As described by the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Hume's “fame and importance” are largely due to “his courageously skeptical approach to a range of philosophical topics” (Fieser). In simple terms, Hume argues that one has no empirical reason to believe in one's own reality, the reality supported by common sense, over other realities, such as those attributed to simulations or dreams, to name a few. The Humean situation indicates that humans are trapped behind a “veil of perception,” as Descartes or Locke described it, in which a logical gap exists between one's impressions or ideas and one's true reality (Rogers). Under this veil of perception, Hume appears to argue that there is no reason why humans should attribute certain intentional or sensory mental states to the external world based on their own perceptions of the internal world, where intentional mental states comprise one's beliefs . and desires, while sensational moods are internal feelings, like pain itself. For this reason, it seems that pain, a sensational state with direct links to emotions, cannot be attributed to another person. In other words, Hume's argument seems to indicate that the logical gap one should make in assuming the sensational state of another is not justified. This logical gap therefore does not justify any individual hypothesis about the perception of pain by others. For this reason, it seems that we cannot even formulate the hypothesis of trying to understand the other's pain, because such attempts would be in vain. Philosophical skepticism, particularly Hume's skepticism, subsequently refutes the claim that pain is a shared notion between individuals on the basis of the a priori and a posteriori leaps that must be made to infer the sensory states of another. In principle one cannot doubt the internal world one experiences, especially regarding pain. However, Hume's argument seems to indicate that this should not be the case for doubt in the external world. Another example that will be presented forsupporting the idea that one's individual sense of pain cannot be attributed to other individuals comes from Bertrand Russell's arguments regarding color. As noted by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, color has been at the forefront of philosophical exploration due to the fact that “color raises serious metaphysical questions, concerning the nature of both physical reality and mind” (Stanford). In this particular case the example of color will be particularly interesting compared to the pain itself. This can be deduced by analyzing a passage from Russell's book The Problems of Philosophy, in which he examines the apparent color of a table: “It is evident from what we have discovered, that there is no color which appears pre-eminently to be the color of the table, or even of any particular part of the table: it appears to be of different colors from different points of view, and there is no reason to regard some of these as more really its color than others. And we know that even from a given point of view the color will seem different in artificial light, or to a color blind person, or to a man with blue glasses, while in the dark there will be no color at all, even if touching and listening to the table will remain unchanged. This color is not something that is inherent in the table, but something that depends on the table, on the viewer and on the way the light falls on the table." As Russell argues, it appears that color cannot serve as a general statement that encompasses all possible perceptions of color among individuals. The same could be said of pain. It seems impossible to use pain as a generic term referring to an individual emotion because pain fluctuates based on multiple factors. So pain is not inherent in being human in the same way that “color is not something that is inherent in the table”. For this reason, as supported by Russell's arguments regarding color, it is not justified to assume what someone else's pain might be based on an individual's perception of personal pain alone. The last argument that will be explored to support the idea that it is not possible to formulate the hypothesis that attempts to understand another person's pain on the basis of one's own personal experience is Thomas Nagel's arguments regarding the philosophy of mind. In one of Nagel's most famous articles, "What is it like to be a bat?" Nagel argues for a normative approach towards understanding other types of consciousness, emphasizing that humans cannot understand other types of consciousness, such as animal consciousness. An excerpt from the article makes the point particularly concisely: "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism - something that is for the organism" (Nagel, 436) . When applied to pain, this argument has the similar effect as Russell's color argument. It is impossible for human beings to formulate a hypothesis about another individual's sense of pain, just as it is impossible for human beings to formulate such a hypothesis about another's consciousness. To rephrase Nagel's argument, "an organism can appreciate another organism's sense of pain only if and only if there is something it means to feel pain – something it feels for the organism." In other words, there must be a common framework that describes what pain is fundamentally and universally for all individuals. However, as is deduced from Russell's argument, this is not the case, since pain has multiple different facts that influence how it is experienced by the individual, that pain is not inherent to the individual, the same way in whose color is not inherent to the individual. table. For these reasons it seems that pain is therefore not analogous to the conscious mental state of an organism, since there is no such thing..