Topic > Formalism and realism in law - 919

The question of the exercise of discretion by judges remains open. The issue in this essay is not how new laws should be created, but rather how judges should go about interpreting laws. This essay will focus on two legal approaches; namely, formalism and realism. Formalism in interpretation separates law from other related concepts such as politics and morality; this means that they should apply legal rules excluding their subjective opinion. Realists are concerned primarily with the nature of judicial decision-making. They argue that the law alone cannot answer every legal question, in addition to the rules, the subjective opinion of the person applying the rules can determine the outcome of a case. It is arguable that HLA Hart has made a commendable contribution to the development of legal philosophy. Hart positioned his theory between formalism and realism. Regarding formalism, he examined what he called "easy cases", cases in which clear rules apply to a set of facts and in which the rules are determinant. Instead, from a realist point of view, he examined what he called "difficult cases", in which he admitted the presence of gaps in the legal rules, which in his opinion left judges with no choice but to exercise discretion. In America the Constitution is accepted as a living document that must be kept updated to meet new circumstances and sensitivities. This idea seems to accept Hart's concession on "hard cases" because it simply suggests that it is better to create new laws than to interpret old ones. Next, I will examine two theories in relation to Hart's view on "hard cases", namely, Dworkin's Interpretivism and Pragmatism. Dworkin's Interpretivism Dworkin's criticism, by contrast, focuses... at the heart of the paper... on urging judges to set aside their subjective opinions when applying legal rules. In Cameron J looked at the general definition of neutrality which involves taking no side in a conflict, i.e. impartial. Neutrality involves not judging the validity of an opinion. Dworkin does not rule out the possibility that some rulings go wrong and that some are right than others, but he still argues that judges have a responsibility to interpret the law and that they should interpret the law in its best moral light. Dworkin's point is that we should accept that all legal disputes are resolved using the law itself. Hart believes there may be gaps in the legislation, although sources such as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa exist, he argues however that such sources will at some point prove indeterminate, forcing judges to exercise discretion.