Following the aftermath of World War II, decolonization across the world was taking place after colonial rulers had been deprived of any feasible measures to restrain them. At the same time, the communist superpower the USSR began a campaign to create a buffer zone of satellite states, against their former allies and the emerging North American Treaty Organization (NATO). A feeling of mutual antagonism between the two created a global stalemate, and the only measurable way to demonstrate their power was in small conflicts: as in Afghanistan for the communists and in Vietnam for the Americans. For the United States, the duel with the Communists led to a strategy to maintain Communist sympathies in isolated, controllable areas. The American strategy became known as containment, more appropriately through military power. Since its fellow NATO allies were unable to provide substantial support, the United States would be alone in its endeavor to contain the rapidly expanding communist regimes. Aside from the other NATO allies, France, which was embarrassingly conquered by the Germans in a matter of weeks, attempted to regain past prestige by re-establishing their dominance in the Indochina sphere. The war pitted the French against a population very fervent against the colonial rulers. When the war turned in favor of the Vietnamese after the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, America attempted to provide support until the eventual exodus of the French. Vietnam was now becoming an American issue, due to the North's substantial support for the communist regime. An action plan would then be deemed necessary to keep communism out of the American-friendly southern sector of Vietnam. I therefore submit the American test case for containment in Vietnam... middle of paper... Erican troops. Thus, the main reasons for American military failure found their genesis in a weak ally and a strong, empowered Northern force. While it can be said with certainty that although the internal problem of Vietnam created a fiasco in itself, American arrogance in their military superiority and complete ignorance of the recent history of the Vietnamese, equally, produced a circumstance in which failure was inevitable. Works Cited Dyke, J. M. (1972). North Vietnam's survival strategy. Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books. Kolko, G. (1985). Anatomy of a war: Vietnam, the United States and the modern historical experience. New York: Pantheon Books. Prados, J. (1995). The hidden history of the Vietnam War. Chicago: I.R. Dee.Thompson, J.C. (1980). Rolling Thunder: Understanding politics and program failure. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.