Topic > Suzuki Samurai - 1217

Suzuki SamuraiIn 1985, the Suzuki automaker was entering the American automotive market with the Suzuki Samurai, a four-wheel-drive lightweight off-road vehicle. One dilemma that the American Suzuki Motor Corporation (ASMC) faced was exactly how to position the Samurai in the American market. There were several options for doing this, each of which had unique advantages and disadvantages, but only one that would actually maximize the Samurai's sales potential. The first option was to position the Samurai as an SUV (Sport Utility Vehicle). The Samurai already had the appearance of a "mini-jeep" and was already equipped with four-wheel drive. Distinguishing itself from all other SUVs, the Samurai was smaller, lighter and less expensive; Suggested retail was about half the price of an average SUV. Leanord Pearstein, CEO of a competing advertising agency, preferred to portray the Samurai as a "rugged little cheap Jeep". Those who had already purchased a car had also considered purchasing a Jeep or other SUV. In 1985 the SUV market was very small. Less than 3% of U.S. auto sales in 1985 came from SUV sales. Douglas Mazza, who ran the Samurai operation in the United States, had a goal of selling 30,000 units within two years, a figure that would surpass all SUV sales in 1984. The second option was to position the Samurai as a pickup truck compact. The market share was two and a half times that of the compact SUV market. This would make it easier for Suzuki to get in if they positioned the vehicle this way. In the pickup market itself, Japanese trucks have sold very well; they accounted for 54% of total compact pickup truck sales. If they wanted to introduce the Samurai as a truck, it would be more versatile and less expensive than a subcompact car. Since customs regulations for compact pickup trucks state that there must be a 25% tariff on all trucks imported into the United States, this is ten times the amount of the tariff for a car. Pearlstein believed that even with the high fee it would be worth paying in the long run, however it was still a significant cost. Another positioning strategy was to sell the Samurai as a subcompact car. This market was significantly larger than the previously indicated markets. Pearlstein suggested marketing it as an alternative to the "boring" automobile, a compact car with a "nicer" appearance".